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Charter Values: The Uncanny Valley
of Canadian Constitutionalism
Matthew Horner*

I. INTRODUCTION
Thirty years after the patriation of the Constitution, it is trite to say
that the advent of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms1
brought about a seismic change in the Canadian constitutional landscape.
Following the entrenchment of a written Charter, civil and human rights
were now expressly enshrined in the Constitution of Canada. No longer
would courts need to mine the backwaters of the federal division of
powers or administrative law to protect the civil rights of individual
Canadians.1A Constitutionally protected and judicially reviewable rights
now existed, in black and white (or sepia), on posters hung on classroom
walls and in lawyers’ offices across the nation. Legislation — and
government action taken pursuant to such legislation — was now subject
to the constitutional limits imposed by those enshrined rights.
Parliamentary sovereignty was thus limited in an important and specific
way following protracted and complex constitutional negotiations.
In the intervening years the interpretation of those rights has been
subject to vigorous debate and modification through the courts. Such
debate was inevitable.
What was not as inevitable is the emerging line of cases that appears
to further limit the scope of legislative and government action by
creating a version of unwritten Charter protections ambiguously termed
*
Counsel, Constitutional Law Branch, Ministry of the Attorney General (Ontario). The
views expressed herein are solely those of the author, and do not represent the position of the
Attorney General or the Government of Ontario. Many thanks to my colleagues Courtney Harris and
Michael Dunn for reviewing an earlier draft of this paper. I am also grateful to the anonymous
reviewers from the Osgoode 2013 Constitutional Cases Conference for their helpful suggestions.
1
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”].
1A
See, e.g., Saumur v. Quebec (City), [1953] S.C.J. No. 49, [1953] 2 S.C.R. 299 (S.C.C.);
Roncarelli v. Duplessis, [1959] S.C.J. No. 1, [1959] S.C.R. 121 (S.C.C.).
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“Charter values”. These Charter values look much like Charter rights, but
are somehow (presumably) different. Their substance is allegedly derived
from the Charter, but their content is amorphous.
Most significant of the recent Charter values cases was the
Supreme Court’s 2012 decision in Doré v. Barreau du Québec.2 Strictly
speaking, the Doré decision simply confirmed that the discretionary
decisions of statutory decision-makers must comply with the Charter,
and provided clarification of the doctrinal process for determining
whether the breach of a Charter right by a statutory decision-maker is
“reasonable”. However, some of the language of that decision has
caused considerable confusion among litigants, tribunals and other
courts. In particular, the Court’s reasons repeatedly refer to the “Charter
value” of freedom of expression despite the fact that the Charter claim
raised by the applicant related to a specific Charter right — freedom of
expression under section 2(b). Why does the Court in Doré transition to
the term “Charter values”? Is the scope of the Charter value broader? Is
the threshold of proof lower? The decision itself provides no answer to
these questions.
In my view, the concept of Charter values should be rejected.
A review of the more than 100 Supreme Court decisions referencing the
term reveals that in most circumstances the concept of Charter values
provides little assistance to Charter analysis. Instead, Charter values
create ambiguity when previously there was none, turning every case
into a “Charter” case, and thereby undermining the important role of
direct Charter review. In addition, because the substantive scope of
Charter values is ill defined, they provide little to no guidance for
decision-makers, and potentially provide — for no principled reason — a
greater limit on the scope of legislation and government decision-making
than would be expected under a traditional Charter rights analysis.
This amorphous and ill-defined area of constitutional law is what I
refer to as the “uncanny valley” of Canadian constitutionalism.
In the 1960s, robotics professor Masahiro Mori examined the
emotional response of humans to robots, and observed that while greater
human likeness generally correlates to increased comfort or familiarity,
when the features of a robot look and move almost — but not quite — like
a natural human being, it will stir a negative emotional response in some
people. This point of revulsion was termed the “uncanny valley” to

2

[2012] S.C.J. No. 12, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 395 (S.C.C.) [herenafter “Doré”].
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describe the sudden drop in comfort experienced by observers of things or
movements that are just shy of human likeness.3 Since that time, the term
has been used to describe a variety of flawed attempts to recreate human
form or movement (dolls, zombies, video game characters). Like an eerie
robot or computer-generated animated character that stirs discomfort in our
unconscious mind because it looks almost — but not quite — human, the
concept of Charter values is where we fall into the “uncanny valley” of
modern Canadian constitutionalism: unwritten yet somehow justiciable
values hidden within a written and enshrined Constitution.
Almost — but not quite — like a Charter right.
This paper is divided into three main parts. First, I examine where
Charter values have arisen, first in the context of judicial interpretation of
the common law, then extending to the interpretation of statutes and the
exercise of statutory powers of discretion.
Second, I consider the substantive meaning of Charter values —
what does the term “Charter values” mean? Is it simply a term of art?
Is it a form of Charter rights “lite”? Or do Charter values refer to an
entire series of unwritten but enforceable constitutional principles?
Finally, I address the why of Charter values. In doing so, I examine
some recent cases and conclude that the concept of Charter values provides
little value to Canadian constitutional law, undermining the important role
of direct Charter rights analysis while creating ambiguity and undue
complexity for courts, tribunals and other statutory decision-makers.

II. WHERE DO CHARTER VALUES ARISE?
There are a number of different circumstances in which the Supreme
Court has made reference to the term “Charter values”, not all of which
are the subject of this paper. In some instances, the term has been used to
describe a purposive approach to interpreting Charter rights themselves.4
Although the use of “Charter values” in this sense has been the subject of

3
M. Mori, “Bukimi no tani [The uncanny valley]” (1970) 7(4) Energy 33-35;
Karl F. MacDorman, et al., “Too real for comfort? Uncanny responses to computer generated faces”
(2009) 25(3) Computers in Human Behavior 695; “Crossing the Uncanny Valley” The Economist
(November 18, 2010).
4
See, e.g., R. v. Advance Cutting & Coring Ltd., [2001] S.C.J. No. 68, [2001] 3 S.C.R.
209, at para. 9 (S.C.C.), per Bastarache J.; Health Services and Support-Facilities Bargaining Assn.
v. British Columbia, [2007] S.C.J. No. 27, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 391, at paras. 39, 81 (S.C.C.).
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criticism,5 for the most part it can be reconciled with the Court’s
long-standing purposive approach to Charter interpretation, whereby the
Court considers the principles (or “values”) underlying a Charter right
when analyzing the scope of the given right (e.g., that the search for
truth, participation in social and political decision-making and selffulfilment are some of the values and principles underlying the Charter,
section 2(b) right to freedom of expression).6
The notion of Charter values becomes considerably less helpful —
and more confusing — when those “values” are applied independently, in
the same manner as properly enshrined rights. As Bastarache J. wrote, in
Gosselin v. Quebec: “‘Charter’ values are an important concept that may
help to inform a Charter right, but they cannot be invoked to modify the
wording of the Charter itself.”7
The focus of this paper is on those circumstances in which Charter
values operate not to understand Charter rights, but to provide a direct
limit on the exercise of a power — in other words, the use of Charter
values as Charter rights. The Supreme Court has relied on Charter values
as an enforceable rights-like concept in three types of legal circumstances:
(1) when developing the common law; (2) when interpreting genuinely
ambiguous legislation; and (3) when reviewing the exercise of a statutory
discretion by a statutory decision-maker.
1. Charter Values in the Development of the Common Law
The notion of “Charter values” as an analytical tool first arose in
circumstances where Charter rights themselves were found to have no
direct application. In the 1986 case, R.W.D.S.U., Local 580 v. Dolphin
Delivery Inc., the Supreme Court had occasion to determine whether and
how the Charter would apply to a common law dispute between private
actors. In its decision, the Court held that Charter rights did not apply
directly to private litigation because section 32 limits the Charter’s
application to the legislative, executive and administrative branches of

5
Ontario (Attorney General) v. Fraser, [2011] S.C.J. No. 20, [2011] 2 S.C.R. 3, at paras. 174,
253 (S.C.C.), per Rothstein J.; R.K. Basu, “Revolution and Aftermath: B.C. Health Services and Its
Implications” in J. Cameron, P. Monahan & B. Ryder, eds. (2008) 42 S.C.L.R. (2d) 165, at 198-99.
6
Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1989] S.C.J. No. 36, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927,
at para. 53 (S.C.C.); R. v. Big M Drug Mart, [1985] S.C.J. No. 17, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295, at 344
(S.C.C.); R. v. Oakes, [1986] S.C.J. No. 7, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 at 119 (S.C.C.).
7
[2002] S.C.J. No. 85, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 429, at para. 203 (S.C.C.), per Bastarache J.
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government.8 The Court rejected the argument that court orders are a
form of government action because to do so would “widen the scope of
Charter application to virtually all private litigation”.9
Nonetheless, the Court went on to hold that while the Charter does
not apply to private, common law litigation directly, the judiciary must
“apply and develop the principles of the common law in a manner
consistent with the fundamental values enshrined in the Constitution”.10
This reference to the “fundamental values” enshrined in the
Constitution evolved into the concept of “Charter values” subsequently
used in the development of common law principles relating to
defamation, publication bans and other judge-made legal concepts.11 This
incorporation of the Charter into the development of the common law
was later described by the Court as a way of shifting judge-made
common law toward Charter compliance, without subjecting an
impugned rule to a full Charter analysis:
Where the principles underlying a common law rule are out of step
with the values enshrined in the Charter, the courts should scrutinize
the rule closely. If it is possible to change the common law rule so as to
make it consistent with Charter values, without upsetting the proper
balance between judicial and legislative action that I have referred to
above, then the rule ought to be changed.12

In adopting the language of Charter values in these common law
cases, the Court was initially careful to distinguish Charter values from
Charter rights, limiting the application of the former to the interpretation
of the common law.13 According to the Court in Hill (in which the Court
considered the effects of the Charter on the law of defamation), while
Charter rights “do not exist in the absence of state action”, a Charter
values claim is meant to address a “conflict between principles” and

[1986] S.C.J. No. 75, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 573 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Dolphin Delivery”].
Id., at para. 36.
10
Id., at para. 39.
11
See, e.g., R. v. Salituro, [1991] S.C.J. No. 97, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 654 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter
“Salituro”]; Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp., [1994] S.C.J. No. 104, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 835
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Dagenais”]; Hill v. Church of Scientology of Toronto, [1995] S.C.J. No. 64,
[1995] 2 S.C.R. 1130 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Hill”]; M. (A.) v. Ryan, [1997] S.C.J. No. 13, [1997] 1
S.C.R. 157 (S.C.C.); WIC Radio Ltd. v. Simpson, [2008] S.C.J. No. 41, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 420
(S.C.C.); Grant v. Torstar Corp., [2009] S.C.J. No. 61, [2009] 3 S.C.R. 640 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter
“Grant”].
12
Salituro, id., at para. 49.
13
Hill, supra, note 11, at para. 95.
8
9
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must therefore be subject to a “more flexible” balancing than the
traditional section 1 analysis.14
This approach was described in more detail in Dagenais, in which
the Court rebalanced the principles underlying the common law rule
governing publication bans on court proceedings, based on Charter
values.15 In imposing publication bans prior to the Charter, courts had
traditionally emphasized the fair trial rights of the accused over the free
expression rights of those affected by the ban. In light of the Charter,
however, the Court found that this balance was inconsistent with the
equal status given to fair trial and free expression rights under sections 2(b)
and 11(d) of the Charter, holding that “[i]t would be inappropriate for the
courts to continue to apply a common law rule that automatically
favoured the rights protected by s. 11(d) over those protected by
s. 2(b)”.16 The Court therefore rebalanced the common law test for
publication bans, requiring the reviewing judge to determine whether a
ban was necessary to prevent a risk to trial fairness and whether the
salutary effects of the ban outweighed the deleterious effects on freedom
of expression rights.17
Following the same approach, the Supreme Court in R.W.D.S.U.,
Local 558 v. Pepsi-Cola Canada Beverages (West) Ltd.18 resolved
conflicting common law decisions respecting the legality of secondary
picketing with reference to the value of freedom of expression expressed
in section 2 (b) of the Charter. The Court in that case, recognizing that
the right protected under section 2(b) is “subject to justificative limits
under s. 1”, held that the same principles apply when interpreting the
common law to reflect Charter values: “The starting point must be
freedom of expression. Limitations are permitted, but only to the extent
that this is shown to be reasonable and demonstrably necessary in a free
and democratic society.”19 On that basis, the Court went on to adopt the
line of cases that limited freedom of expression in a manner that it found
to be justified.
Thus, in these early Charter values cases governing the development
of the common law, the Court recognized that judge-made law, while not
subject to the Charter, could not continue to develop without regard to
14
15
16
17
18
19

Id., at para. 97.
Dagenais, supra, note 11.
Id., at paras. 69, 72.
Id., at para. 73.
[2002] S.C.J. No. 7, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 156 (S.C.C.).
Id., at paras. 36-37, 67.
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the Charter’s terms. When a common law rule came into direct conflict
with a Charter right, the principles underlying that rule would have to be
rebalanced on the basis of Charter values. This approach further
recognizes that while judge-made common law may develop in
accordance with Charter values, it is always subject to being overridden
by legislation, which will be directly subject to a Charter rights analysis.
2. Charter Values as a Tool of Statutory Interpretation
Following the Court’s decision in Dolphin Delivery establishing that
Charter values could be used to infuse the development of the common
law, a parallel jurisprudence developed regarding the use of Charter
values to interpret statutory law. Indeed, the earliest use of the phrase
“Charter values” is found in Hills v. Canada (Attorney General), which
involved the interpretation of a provision of the Unemployment
Insurance Act.20 At issue in that case was whether unemployment
benefits extended to employees who were not working due to a strike by
members of their own union (though a different union local). In
determining whether the non-striking workers were “financing” the
striking local for the purposes of the Act, L’Heureux-Dubé J. noted that
“the values embodied in the Charter must be given preference over an
interpretation that would run contrary to them”.21
However, even from this earliest case, at least two risks associated
with the adoption of a Charter values approach in statutory interpretation
cases can be identified. First, there does not appear to have been any
need to resort to Charter values, and yet the Court felt the need to refer to
them to offer further support for its conclusion. In her reasons,
L’Heureux-Dubé J. appears to have reached her ultimate conclusion on
the basis of a purposive interpretation of the Act.22 Moving on to note
that such an interpretation also has the benefit of being consistent with
Charter values provided little assistance to the legal question at hand, and
needlessly adds complexity and ambiguity to the analysis.23
Second, and as will be dealt with in more detail below, it is apparent
that the meaning of Charter values, while rhetorically powerful, is
substantively unclear. In Hills, L’Heureux-Dubé J. highlights her support
20
21
22
23

[1988] S.C.J. No. 22, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 513 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Hills”].
Id., at para. 93.
Id., at paras. 92, 95-96.
Id., at para. 93.
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of a Charter values approach by noting and agreeing that the appellant
union, “while not relying on any specific provision of the Charter,
nevertheless urged that preference be given to Charter values in the
interpretation of a statute, namely freedom of association”.24
In applying Charter values in this way, L’Heureux-Dubé J. seems to
suggest that a claim to Charter values need not rely on any specific
provision of the Charter, but then, somewhat confusingly, references
freedom of association, which is in fact specifically guaranteed by
section 2(d) of the Charter. As will be discussed further below, this
ambiguity continues to exist in defining the substantive content of
Charter values.
While L’Heureux-Dubé J. continued for many years to argue for a
broad application of Charter values in the context of statutory
interpretation,25 subsequent majorities of the Court have highlighted the
risk of over-reliance on Charter values in the interpretation of statutes
and have established a jurisprudence that strictly limits the scope of their
use in this context. As the Court recognized in its 1993 decision in
Symes, reliance on Charter values to interpret a statute must be limited to
those instances in which the Court is faced with statutory language that is
genuinely ambiguous. To infuse statutory interpretation with Charter
values in all cases would undermine the importance of the Charter itself,
depriving
the Charter of a more powerful purpose, namely, the determination of a
statute’s constitutional validity. If statutory meanings must be made
congruent with the Charter even in the absence of ambiguity, then it
would never be possible to apply, rather than simply consult, the values
of the Charter. Furthermore, it would never be possible for the
government to justify infringements as reasonable limits under s. 1 of
the Charter, since the interpretive process would preclude one from
finding infringements in the first place.26

This concern that the use of Charter values would undermine the
more powerful role of direct Charter review was expressed again in Bell
ExpressVu Limited Partnership v. Rex,27 in which the Court emphasized

24

Id., at para. 93 (emphasis added).
See, e.g., Canada (Attorney General) v. Mossop, [1993] S.C.J. No. 20, [1993] 1 S.C.R.
554, at para. 94 (S.C.C.), per L’Heureux-Dubé J.; Symes v. Canada, [1993] S.C.J. No. 131, [1993]
4 S.C.R. 695, at para. 190 (S.C.C.), per L’Heureux-Dubé J [hereinafter “Symes”].
26
Symes, id., at para. 105, per Iacobucci J.
27
[2002] S.C.J. No. 43, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 559 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Bell ExpressVu”].
25
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the distinction between judge-made common law and statutory
provisions. Because the latter embody legislative intent, the Court held
that “to the extent this Court has recognized a ‘Charter values’
interpretive principle, such principle can only receive application in
circumstances of genuine ambiguity, i.e., where a statutory provision is
subject to differing, but equally plausible, interpretations”.28 In reaching
this conclusion, the Court emphasized that expanding the use of Charter
values to interpret all legislation risks shearing the legislature of its
constitutional power to enact reasonable limits on Charter rights and
freedoms, which rights would in turn “be inflated to near absolute
status”.29 The importance of direct Charter review was again emphasized
in Abella J.’s concurring reasons in R. v. Gomboc, where she stressed that
Charter values “cannot be used as a freewheeling deus ex machina to
subvert clear statutory language, or to circumvent the need for direct
Charter scrutiny with its attendant calibrated evidentiary and
justificatory requirements”.30
Absent ambiguity, a court that interprets a clear statutory provision
“so as to accord with its view of minimal constitutional norms” risks
“effectively [trumping] the constitutional analysis, [rewriting] the
legislation, and [depriving] the government of the means of justifying, if
need be, any infringement on constitutionally guaranteed rights”.31
Two Supreme Court decisions from the last year have confirmed
the limited role that Charter values can play in statutory interpretation.
In R. v. Clarke, the Supreme Court once again affirmed that a consideration
of Charter values only arises if the statute is found to be genuinely
ambiguous, holding that “[i]f the statute is unambiguous, the court must
give effect to the clearly expressed legislative intent”.32 The Court further
cautioned courts and tribunals against using Charter values to “create
ambiguity when none exists”.33
Similarly, in Martin v. Alberta (Workers’ Compensation Board), the
Court confirmed that Charter values cannot be used as means of avoiding

28

Id., at para. 62 (emphasis in original).
Id., at para. 66.
30
[2010] S.C.J. No. 55, [2010] 3 S.C.R. 211, at para. 87 (S.C.C.), per Abella J [hereinafter
“Gomboc”].
31
Id., at para. 88, per Abella J.; see also R. v. Rodgers, [2006] S.C.J. No. 15, [2006]
1 S.C.R. 554, at paras. 18, 20 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Rodgers”]; Charlebois v. Saint John (City),
[2005] S.C.J. No. 77, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 563, at para. 23 (S.C.C.).
32
[2014] S.C.J. No. 100, 2014 SCC 28, at para. 12 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Clarke”].
33
Id., at para. 1.
29
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the evidentiary and legal requirements of a direct Charter challenge.34 At
issue in Martin was whether an Alberta federal worker’s claim for
compensation due to chronic onset stress was subject to provincial rules
governing chronic stress claims, or was exclusively subject to the federal
Government Employees Compensation Act.35 In arguing that the
provincial policies should not apply under the terms of the GECA, the
worker argued that the GECA should be interpreted in accordance with
Charter values to prevent the application of the provincial rules, which
the worker claimed would result in discrimination on the basis of mental
disability. The Supreme Court rejected this argument, recognizing, in
part, that reinterpreting the legislation to accord with Charter values
would create an end run around a constitutional challenge to the
underlying provincial policies without a proper record to directly
consider their compliance with Charter rights:
[T]he appellant relied on the values in the Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms to argue that the definition of “accident” must be
interpreted in a way that does not impose additional causality burdens
on claimants for mental health injuries as compared to claimants for
physical injuries. However, the constitutionality of the provisions was
not challenged before this Court. For this Court to make a
determination based on Charter values would in effect be to decide a
Charter challenge to the Policy without a proper record.36

Thus, the Supreme Court has clearly held that Charter values can
play a role in the interpretation of statutes, but has expressly limited the
circumstances in which those values will have relevance to cases of
genuine ambiguity. In so doing, the Court has recognized that an overly
broad interpretation or application of Charter values risks undermining
the important role of Charter rights and placing unjustified limits on the
scope of legislation.
It should be noted, however, that in adopting the language of Charter
values in these cases, the Court has offered no explanation for why
“Charter values” are being assessed as opposed to Charter rights. While
the common law cases at the origin of this case law emphasized that
Charter rights were not directly applicable under section 32 of the
Charter and therefore required a degree of analytical separation from the
concept of the direct Charter right violation, the same doctrinal concern
34
35
36

[2014] S.C.J. No. 25, 2014 SCC 25 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Martin”].
R.S.C. 1985, c. G-5 [hereinafter “GECA”].
Martin, supra, note 34, at para. 53.
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does not arise when interpreting a legislative Act. As discussed further
below, this change in language suggests that there is a substantive
difference between Charter rights and Charter values.
3. Charter Values to Limit the Exercise of Statutory Discretion
Finally, the concept of Charter values has most recently been raised
in a third category of case, the application of a statutory decision-maker’s
power of discretion.
Since its decision in Slaight Communications Inc. v. Davidson,37
25 years ago, the Supreme Court has recognized that a statutory decisionmaker must exercise any power of discretion in a manner that accords
with the Charter. This has traditionally been addressed through the
standard lens of Charter rights, not Charter values. In Slaight
Communications itself, for instance, the question was whether the order
of a labour arbitrator requiring the employer to provide a letter of
recommendation violated the employer’s freedom of expression under
section 2(b) of the Charter in an unreasonable (under section 1) manner.38
Twenty-three years after Slaight Communications, Abella J., for a
unanimous Court in Doré, confirmed that the exercise of a statutory
discretion must conform with the Charter, but restated the process for
applying and reviewing the Charter in such contexts, holding that the
reasonableness of rights violations should be assessed not through the
lens of a traditional Charter, section 1 Oakes analysis, but instead
through the “administrative law” approach of reasonableness and
proportionality.39
Leaving aside the differences (if any) that could be said to exist
between these two approaches to determining reasonableness, what is of
particular note in Doré for the purposes of this paper is the Court’s
repeated use of the term “Charter values” to describe the constitutional
entitlements before it.40 At issue in Doré was whether a Barreau du Québec
disciplinary committee’s exercise of its statutory discretion to reprimand a
lawyer for statements he made about a judge violated his freedom of
37
[1989] S.C.J. No. 45, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1038, at para. 87 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Slaight
Communications”].
38
Id., at para. 88. See also Multani v. Commission scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys, [2006]
S.C.J. No. 6, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 256 (S.C.C.).
39
Doré, supra, note 2, at para. 35; R. v. Oakes, [1986] S.C.J. No. 7, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Oakes”].
40
Id., at paras. 23-59.
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expression under the Charter. In this context, the use of the term “Charter
values” throughout Abella J.’s reasons is notable, given that Mr. Doré had
never argued that the Barreau’s penalty violated some amorphous Charter
value or values. The argument was that his Charter right to freedom of
expression had been violated.41 And yet, in its decision the Court adopts
the language of Charter values throughout its analysis.
Thus again, as in Hills, the Court in Doré expressly chose to rely on
a concept of Charter values even though the Charter value at issue was
freedom of expression, which is clearly and expressly enshrined as a
Charter right. The Court offers no explanation of why such a shift in
language was necessary.
The Court’s discussion of Charter values in Doré, although limited in
that case to the exercise of a statutory discretion, also raised the
possibility that courts, tribunals and other statutory decision-makers
would improperly expand the use of Charter values beyond the
principled confines of genuinely ambiguous laws and the exercise
of statutory discretions. This potential was seen most recently in
Alberta (Information and Privacy Commissioner) v. United Food and
Commercial Workers, Local 401.42 In that case, the claimants alleged that
the failure of Alberta’s Personal Information Protection Act43 to provide
an exception for union activities violated their freedom of expression
under section 2(b) of the Charter. While the Alberta Court of Appeal
undertook a traditional constitutional analysis, it also suggested that the
Court’s decision in Doré could mean that the adjudicator had jurisdiction
to consider whether the legislation could be interpreted in accordance
with Charter values. It reached this conclusion despite the fact that the
legislation was not ambiguous and did not confer a statutory discretion
upon the decision-maker.44 Indeed, the statutory adjudicator under the
Alberta Act lacked constitutional jurisdiction to consider the validity of
the Act at all, and declined to do so. The argument in favour of a Charter
values approach was advanced by the Information and Privacy
Commissioner before the Supreme Court, which ultimately chose not to
deal with the issue. Nonetheless, the Alberta Court of Appeal’s decision
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S.A. 2003, c. P-6.5.
44
United Food and Commercial Workers, Local 401 v. Alberta (Attorney General), [2012]
A.J. No. 427, 2012 ABCA 130, at paras. 38-42 (Alta. C.A.) [hereinafter “UFCW”].
42

(2014), 67 S.C.L.R. (2d)

CHARTER VALUES: THE UNCANNY VALLEY

373

demonstrates the confusion surrounding the appropriate use of Charter
values, and the tendency toward expanding the scope of their application.
Another example of this potential expansion of Charter jurisdiction
through the application of a Charter values analysis has recently arisen in
a series of cases coming out of Ontario’s Health Services Appeal and
Review Board (“HSARB”). As with the adjudicator in Alberta IPC, the
Ontario legislature has passed specific legislation indicating that the
HSARB does not have the jurisdiction to determine the constitutional
validity of any law or regulation.45 However, in a recent Divisional Court
decision upholding a Board finding that it lacked the jurisdiction to
consider the constitutional validity of a statutory provision, the Court
went on to discuss in obiter the possibility that a claimant could argue
before the Board that the “application” of the law violated the Charter.46
This has led to some confusion on the part of claimants, who in several
instances have attempted to recast constitutional challenges to provisions
of the Health Insurance Act47 as Charter values challenges to the
statutory decision-maker’s “application” of the law, even where the
decision-maker has no discretion and is simply implementing an explicit
provision of the law.48 In response to this, the Board held in a subsequent
case that where a Charter challenge is to a non-discretionary decision
based on the regulation, it is in essence a challenge to the validity of the
regulation and therefore beyond the jurisdiction of the Board.49 However,
the courts have not expressly confirmed this conclusion, and so a lack of
clarity remains as to the extent to which Charter arguments may be
advanced before the Board despite the express statutory revocation of its
constitutional jurisdiction.
This confusion appears (hopefully) to have been resolved by the
Supreme Court’s recent decision in Clarke, in which the Court clearly held
that in the administrative law context, the “divining rod that attracts
Charter values” is “whether the exercise of discretion by the administrative
decision-maker unreasonably limits the Charter protections in light of the
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Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care Appeal and Review Boards Act, 1998, S.O.
1998, c. 18, Sch. H, s. 6(3).
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H. (E.) v. Ontario (Health Insurance Plan, General Manager), [2012] O.J. No. 4376
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legislative objective of the statutory scheme”.50 The Court’s decision
in Clarke underlines that it is only in the exercise of a statutory discretion
that Charter values are properly raised in the administrative context.
Charter values are not, therefore, applicable when an administrative
decision-maker is tasked with interpreting and applying an unambiguous
statute.
Nonetheless, while the Court has narrowly defined the circumstances
in which Charter values may be relied upon, the recent UFCW and
HSARB cases suggest that the power of Charter rhetoric is likely to
expand the application of Charter values, despite the Supreme Court’s
admonitions that such values must not be used as a deus ex machina to
subvert clear statutory language, and that doing so undermines the role of
the Charter and of Charter review.
In sum, it appears from the language of Doré and Clarke that the
exercise and review of discretionary decisions by statutory decisionmakers is now, like the interpretation of the common law and ambiguous
statutes, an area in which Charter values may be applied.51 The question
this leaves is whether the adoption of Charter values language in Doré
actually expands the scope of Charter-based restrictions that a decisionmaker must consider when exercising a statutory discretion. To answer
this question, we must consider the substantive content of Charter values.

III. WHAT ARE CHARTER VALUES?
As suggested above, the Supreme Court has had difficulty describing
the substance of Charter values. From the very first reference to Charter
values in Hills, in which the Court relied on the “Charter value” of
freedom of association instead of the “Charter right” to freedom of
association, the amorphous, ill-defined nature of Charter values has been
apparent. The frustratingly indeterminate nature of Charter values was
implicitly highlighted most recently in the dissenting reasons in R. v.
Cairney, in which the minority held that the objective element of the
defence of provocation should be informed by contemporary norms,
“including Charter values”.52 However, no description of the content of
those values was provided. Instead, all that is offered is an example of
values that are not Charter values, with the minority (although
50
51
52
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presumably not on this point) stating specifically that Charter values “do
not include aggressively proprietary atavistic attitudes”.53 That much, at
least, is clear.54
Nonetheless, the case law suggests three possible answers to this
question. Occasionally, Charter values are referred to when, in fact, a
Charter right is clearly at issue (Doré, Hills). In other instances, they are
used to describe a more amorphous version of an enumerated right
(Conseil scolaire, infra). Finally, in still other cases the Court appears to
suggest that Charter values represent a broad array of principles and
values, which underlie the Charter but are not limited by those
enumerated rights (Salituro, Hill).
1. Charter Values as Co-extensive with Charter Rights
As noted above, the origins of the Court’s “Charter values”
discussion can be found in its approach to developing the common law in
accordance with the Charter. In that limited scenario, it was
acknowledged by the Court that recourse to section 1 of the Charter was
not appropriate given that there was no legislatively prescribed limit on
the right to analyze. Instead, the Court held in Hill that a Charter values
claim must be subject to a “more flexible” balancing than the traditional
section 1 analysis.55
Thus, one possible explanation for the Court’s use of the term
“Charter values” is that it is not describing a different body of rights,
but is using the phrase as a term of art meaning “the application of
Charter rights without recourse to a full section 1 analysis”. The Court’s
decision in Doré offers some support for this conception of “Charter
values”. In rejecting the section 1 Oakes framework for assessing the
Charter compliance of discretionary decisions by statutory decisionmakers, the Court in Doré relies on the common law Charter values case
law of Hill and Grant to reject a strict Oakes analysis under section 1 in
the circumstances of discretionary administrative decision-making.56
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This could explain the Court’s use of the term Charter values despite the
fact that it was clearly a specific Charter right that was at issue.
Similarly, as noted above, the Court has remarked upon the lack of
section 1 Charter analysis when applying Charter values as a tool of
statutory interpretation. Again, this lack of section 1 analysis could
explain the Court’s use of the “Charter values” term in that context.57
Accordingly, on this reading, it could be that Charter values create no
new substantive limits on legislative or government action, but simply
reflect a legal assessment of Charter rights in circumstances that do not
permit a full section 1 analysis. This is the least disruptive conception of
Charter values, but it is still one that is subject to overuse. As described
above in relation to the UFCW and HSARB cases, the rhetorical power
of Charter values language frequently threatens to erode the purportedly
strict doctrinal limits on their use.
2. Charter Values as Charter Rights “Lite”
The difficulty with this narrow reading of Charter values is that in
many instances, claimants and courts are in fact using the concept of
Charter values to expand the scope of the Charter’s protections beyond
the rights that would be protected under a traditional Charter challenge.
Even in the common law Charter values cases discussed above, in which
the term “Charter values” was expressly used to create an analytical
distinction between the direct application of Charter rights and the
development of the common law, we see that the Courts would refer to
Charter values other than those enumerated and enshrined as
constitutional rights. For example, in Hill, the Court elevated the concept
of the “good reputation of an individual” to a Charter-protected value.58
This expanded substantive notion of Charter values can be observed
in two ways. First, in some instances, courts applying Charter values may
refer to specific Charter rights, but ignore or minimize the textual or
jurisprudential restrictions on the application of those rights. This is what
I refer to as the “Charter-lite” conception of Charter values. In still other
instances, described in more detail in the next section, Charter values
have been offered even more expanded substantive content, to include
concepts that have little or no basis in the Charter text.
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The Charter-lite conception of Charter values has been seen in those
cases in which Charter values claims are made with respect to “equality”
or “liberty”, both of which are protected rights under the Charter, but are
internally limited.59 The fundamental problem with this Charter-lite
conception of Charter values is that it creates a constitutional limit on
legislative conduct or government action that was expressly not reflected
in the text of the Charter. For example, courts have been clear that section 7
of the Charter requires claimants to demonstrate not only that they
have been deprived of life, liberty or security of the person, but that such
deprivation fails to accord with a principle of fundamental justice.60
When a claim of Charter values is made on the basis of “liberty” alone,
however, this nuanced analysis (or, what Abella J. in Gomboc calls the
“attendant calibrated evidentiary and justificatory requirements” of direct
Charter scrutiny) is lost, and legislative and government action may be
limited for reasons that would not otherwise amount to the violation of a
Charter right.61
Similarly, the Court has repeatedly recognized that the equality
guarantee in section 15 of the Charter protects against substantive
discrimination, not mere distinctions.62 The determination of whether a
law is substantively discriminatory has been shown to be a complex,
contextualized process that necessarily considers the purpose of the
legislation and the historical disadvantage suffered by a claimant group.
A Charter-lite conception of Charter values risks having courts, tribunals
and other decision-makers abandon this nuanced, finely calibrated
conception of the right in favour of simply applying legislation as
broadly as possible to avoid creating any distinctions, even though such
distinctions might, on a direct Charter challenge, be found to be
consistent with the equality guarantee of section 15.63
Such an approach is also doctrinally unsound because it creates a
broader right in the case of statutory interpretation and government
59
See, e.g., R. v. Tse, [2012] S.C.J. No. 16, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 531 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter
“Tse”]; Rodgers, supra, note 31; R. v. Mabior, [2012] S.C.J. No. 47, [2012] 2 S.C.R. 584 (S.C.C.);
Gyorffy v. Drury, [2013] O.J. No. 3108 (Ont. Div. Ct.) [hereinafter “Gyorffy”].
60
See, e.g., A. Cameron & P. Daly, “Furthering Substantive Equality Through
Administrative Law: Charter Values in Education” in J. Cameron, B.L. Berger & S. Lawrence, eds.
(2013) 63 S.C.L.R. (2d) 169, at 188 [hereinafter “Cameron & Daly”].
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62
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action than would be protected under a direct challenge to legislation.
If Charter values are interpreted as “Charter rights without any doctrinal
framework”, one can imagine that Charter claimants will have greater
success arguing that legislation should be interpreted in accordance with
Charter values than in arguing that the law infringes his or her Charter
rights. Courts would reach different results, and Charter protections
would be broader or narrower, depending on whether the legislation
restricts behaviour directly and unambiguously (in which case specific
Charter rights are engaged), or confers a discretion upon a government
decision-maker to restrict the same behaviour (in which case, broader
Charter values are engaged). There is no principled basis for different
outcomes to result from these two scenarios.
A recent example of the Charter-lite approach, in which Charter
values can be used to subsume the express limits of the Charter text, was
seen in arguments made (although ultimately rejected by the majority) in
Conseil scolaire francophone de la Colombie-Britannique v. British
Columbia.64 In that case, the Court was required to determine whether a
1731 Act requiring that non-English documents be translated into
English for use in court had been received into British Columbia law, and
whether such requirements had been implicitly modified. One argument
raised by the appellants was that the interpretation of the law, including
the 1731 Act, must accord with Charter values and constitutional
principles, and in particular the Charter’s explicit recognition that
English and French are the official languages of Canada.65
In addressing these arguments, the Court made no mention of
whether the law is genuinely ambiguous (and, therefore, what role
Charter values should play in the analysis). Nonetheless, the minority
reasons would have required the Court to exercise its inherent
jurisdiction in accordance with the Charter value of bilingualism.66 It
would have done so despite the fact that, as the majority notes, while
section 16 of the Charter does recognize that English and French are the
official languages of Parliament and the Government of Canada, section
16.1 to 20 of the Charter expressly detail the scope of constitutionally
protected bilingual services. In all instances, those rights are limited to
the federal and New Brunswick governments and the courts of those
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jurisdictions. No constitutional right is established with respect to
bilingual services in other provinces.67
Thus the Charter values argument advanced in Conseil scolaire would
have limited the scope of the legislation at issue on the basis that it
conflicts with a Charter right that the British Columbia legislature had
clearly chosen not to enshrine. As the majority noted, under section 16(3)
of the Charter the legislature is free to promote the use of French in its courts
or to seek a constitutional amendment enshrining such rights in the province,
but it is not constitutionally required to do so, and has not done so.68
The majority of the Court recognized this latter point as a “principle of
federalism”.69 But, more simply, it is logically incoherent that where there
exists no Charter right obligating a specific legislative or government
action (and where, in fact, the text suggests that such right exists in some
jurisdictions but not others), the Charter values underlying that Charter
right could somehow be read to require the exact opposite conclusion.
3. “Charter Values” Beyond the Text of the Charter
The third form of substantive content attributed to Charter values is
that they create a broad array of justiciable claims, unrestrained by the
constitutional text. This is the most troubling conception of Charter
values, with nearly limitless potential to narrow the scope of legislation
and administrative decision-making for reasons that are not reflected in
any of the constitutionally enshrined protections of the Charter.
This broader conception of Charter values arose early on in the
Court’s Charter values jurisprudence and continues to this day. In
Salituro, for instance, the Court did not found its consideration of Charter
values on any express Charter right but on the “fundamental values that
provide the foundation for the Charter”, including an imprecise
conception of “respect for the freedom of all individuals, which has
become a central tenet of the legal and moral fabric of this country
particularly since the adoption of the Charter”.70 The difficulty with this
flexible, amorphous approach to “Charter values” quickly becomes
67
Although it should be noted that s. 16(3) provides that nothing in the Charter limits the
authority of a provincial legislature to promote or advance the equality or status of English or
French. Id., at paras. 55-56.
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evident when one considers the substantive content that the Court gives
to the value of “respect for the freedom of all individuals”. In relying on
this Charter value of generalized “freedom” to modify the rule against
spousal privilege, the Court in Salituro states that such freedom includes
the “right of the individual to choose freely whether or not to testify”.71
However, as anyone who has been a witness to a proceeding is well
aware, there is very little “freedom” in fulfilling one’s legal duties to be a
witness. Indeed, if there is any freedom involved in choosing whether or
not to testify, it is a particularly narrow freedom, one which must give
way to a legal summons, requires that the witness answer any and all
relevant questions asked by counsel, and provides no opportunity for the
witness to give testimony other than through the answering of questions.
Thus, from its earliest incarnations, this broad approach to Charter
values was demonstrated to have a nearly limitless capacity to create
enforceable Charter-based requirements, with little regard to the
language of the Charter. Such a wide substantive divergence between the
Charter’s rights and the Charter values that are said to underlie them
reveals the ambiguity and potential arbitrariness of a Charter values
analysis as well as their disconnect from the language of the Charter.
Indeed, in their paper, “Charter Values and Administrative Justice”, Dean
Lorne Sossin and Mark Friedman recognize and adopt this broader
conception of Charter values, untethered from the constitutional text,
noting that “[w]hile Charter values may be seen as limited simply to the
text of Charter rights differently applied in administrative justice settings,
this does not appear to be how the courts themselves have conceived of
Charter values, nor would such a formalist approach be in keeping with
the robust and adaptive administrative law framework invoked in
Doré”.72 Sossin and Friedman go on to identify a number of these
broader Charter values from the case law, including fairness, autonomy,
and human dignity, while recognizing that “many of the values set out
lack an important contextual dimension”.73
The practical limitations of such a broad notion of Charter values are
reflected in the Court’s application of Charter values to the common law
of defamation. While the Court in Hill clarified the analytical approach
to applying Charter values, it did not bring clarity to the substantive
71
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scope of Charter values. The defendant in Hill argued that the common
law of defamation in Canada was applied too broadly in light of Charter
values of freedom of expression. However, in undertaking its Charter
values analysis, the Court in Hill recognized and weighed additional
Charter values, including elevating the protection of personal reputation
to the status of Charter value, noting that “the good reputation of the
individual represents and reflects the innate dignity of the individual, a
concept which underlies all the Charter rights”.74
In addition to moving well beyond the language or rights of the
Charter and unnecessarily creating a shadow constitution of additional
enforceable interests, this broad approach to Charter values can also be
seen as, in fact, diminishing the utility of a Charter-based approach. If
every interest is a Charter value, then what is a decision-maker left to
balance?
An example of this was seen in Grant, in which the Supreme Court
returned, 14 years after Hill, to the notion of Charter values to determine
whether to incorporate a responsible communication defence into the
common law of defamation.75 As in Hill, the Court weighed the competing
values of freedom of expression and protection of reputation (the latter of
which is not supported by any free-standing Charter right but was linked
with concerns for personal privacy). Ultimately, the Court determined that
the current law gave insufficient weight to the constitutional value of
freedom of expression and that the new defence provided proportionate
protection to the core concern of personal reputations.76
While the newly recognized defence may be wholly supportable on
its own terms (and the Court conducted a full analysis of international
case law to support the common law policy change), it is unclear what
the introduction of Charter values added to the discussion. If, as in
Dagenais, the argument were that the freedom of expression, as an
enshrined constitutional right, was deserving of greater protection than
had previously been provided for under the common law, one could see
the value of introducing a Charter values approach to the development of
the common law. However, the Court in Grant (following Hill) adopted a
broader conception of Charter values, one in which the “protection of
reputation” was also included as a Charter value to be balanced.77 The
74
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problem with this application of Charter values is that if all the values
that traditionally informed the common law of defamation are now
Charter values, what purpose is served by relating new common law
developments to the Charter?
This brings us to the final question posed by this paper — why
Charter values?

IV. WHY CHARTER VALUES?
Having discussed the circumstances in which Charter values may be
raised, and the scope of what Charter values may or may not mean, the
final question to be asked is — why? Do Charter values create any
“value” for constitutional jurisprudence in Canada?
As the case law reviewed above confirms, the language of Charter
values, although frequently relied upon, provides little value to the
constitutional jurisprudence. It should therefore be rejected, for at least
two reasons. First, the lack of defined Charter values provides little
assistance to decision-makers in interpreting ambiguous statutes or
exercising a statutory discretion. Second, reliance on Charter values risks
creating ambiguity in decision-making where previously there was none,
turning every conflict into a Charter issue.
Instead, conflict with Charter rights created by the interpretation of
ambiguous statutes or the application of a statutory discretion should be
addressed directly, so that they can be assessed in a calibrated, nuanced
manner. If a rights violation is identified, the interpretation of the law or
application of the discretion can then be modified to ensure that any
rights violation is reasonable and proportionate in the circumstances.
Even in the common law cases — in which reliance on Charter values
instead of Charter rights can be partially explained by the doctrinal need to
distinguish the Charter analysis from a direct Charter review — the use of
Charter values has more often than not created more confusion than it is
worth: first, by relying on Charter values that go beyond the text of the
Charter and second, as in Grant, by creating a complex Charter values
balancing process when a more modest common law policy review leads
to the same conclusion. Accordingly, as with the consideration of statutory
instruments, courts interpreting the common law would likely be best
served by refraining from introducing the complexity of Charter
considerations unless absolutely necessary and, even then, should limit the
scope of those considerations to actual Charter rights.
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1. Charter Values Fail to Provide Adequate Guidance to
Decision-makers
As discussed above, the Supreme Court has left considerable
ambiguity in the substantive meaning of Charter values. As a result,
directing decision-makers to interpret legislation or exercise a statutory
discretion “in accordance with Charter values” is an unhelpful prospect,
and risks creating significant confusion.
This problem was highlighted most recently in the Court’s decision
in Divito v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness).78 The
Court in Divito was asked to determine whether certain provisions of the
International Transfer of Offenders Act,79 which required the Minister of
Public Safety to consider whether an offender’s return to Canada would
constitute a threat to the security of Canada before determining whether
to consent to his or her transfer back to Canada, violated the claimant’s
mobility rights under section 6(1) of the Charter. The majority held that
the provisions did not violate section 6(1), but cautioned that when the
Minister exercises discretion under the Act to consent to the transfer,
such discretion “must be exercised reasonably, including in compliance
with relevant Charter values”.80
Not unexpectedly, the Court chose not to speculate on the
circumstances in which Charter values would require the Minister to
depart from a purposive application of the Act. However, given the
amorphous nature of Charter values, one cannot help but wonder when or
how Charter values would require the Minister to permit a transfer despite
the fact that he or she had reasonably determined that the offender’s return
to Canada would “constitute a threat to the security of Canada”.81 Dignity?
Freedom of expression? Freedom more generally? A Charter values
approach requires the decision-maker to hypothesize about these
possibilities in the abstract, instead of concretely determining whether an
order will violate a specific individual’s specific Charter rights.
This is a clear example of Charter values raising more questions than
they answer for courts, tribunals and other statutory decision-makers.
A more helpful, calibrated approach would be for a decision-maker to
consider the facts and apply the law consistently with its purpose. Only
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then should the decision-maker exercising a statutory power of discretion
turn his or her mind to the question of whether such a decision would
violate the claimant’s Charter rights. And only then, if a Charter breach
results from a reasonable application of the governing law, need the
decision-maker determine whether limiting the Charter right would be
reasonable and proportionate in the circumstances.
Nor can it be convincingly argued that a Charter values approach to
decision-making would assist less-expert tribunals and other
administrative decision-makers in reaching decisions that effectively
incorporate Charter concerns. Given the amorphous, ill-defined character
of Charter values, their application by administrative decision-makers is
more likely to create confusion rather than resolve it. Sossin and
Friedman, for instance, acknowledge that their proposed Charter values
methodology would “generate a body of training materials, guidelines
and reasons on Charter values which, if paired with thoughtful and
considered judicial commentary on judicial reviews of such decisions,
could result in a constructive and principled framework for the
application of discretionary authority”.82 In my view, this is not a path to
simplified decision-making.
2. Charter Values Often Create Ambiguity Instead of Resolving It
Second, the use of Charter values diminishes the value of Charter
rights, turning potentially every administrative decision into a
“constitutional” one and creating ambiguity where there was none
before.
This capacity for Charter values to turn every decision into a Charter
inquiry can be seen in one of the first detailed assessments by legal
scholars of how to apply the Charter values analysis from Doré to future
administrative decision-making.83 In their recent paper “Furthering
Substantive Equality Through Administrative Law: Charter Values in
Education”, Professors Angela Cameron and Paul Daly build on the
Court’s decision in Doré to suggest a framework for decision-makers in
the education sector. The authors’ thesis is that the Doré framework
would assist decision-makers in furthering substantive equality through
the application of Charter values. In setting out their framework, the
authors would have administrators (including, for example, teachers and
82
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principals making decisions about textbooks) approach every decision
with a view to determining its effect on substantive equality.84 In
following this approach, decision-makers would rely not only on Charter
jurisprudence, but also on informal Charter-lite conception of substantive
equality as a Charter value.85
However, instead of furthering substantive equality, such an
approach risks creating a significant amount of confusion and
inconsistency in administrative decision-making. It would turn every
decision into a potential Charter decision, requiring that all decisionmakers (including those we would not consider to be adjudicative
decision-makers) take into account not only the complex Charter
jurisprudence respecting section 15, but broader conceptions of
“substantive equality” that go beyond the text of the Charter. Such an
approach risks paralyzing the decision-making process. It also ignores
the fact that in any given circumstance, a decision-maker faces many
options, several or many of which may be Charter compliant. Indeed, in
the vast majority of decisions, no Charter right is ever engaged. In that
case, it is unclear how an approach that begins the decision-making
process with a consideration of Charter values in the abstract assists the
decision-maker in reaching her decision in a manner consistent with the
purposes of the governing statutory authority.
A more disciplined approach to ensuring substantive equality would
be for decision-makers to exercise their discretion in accordance with
legislative purpose. The legislative purpose may be broad, and permit a
variety of outcomes, but if made in accordance with the purposes of a
constitutionally valid statute (which will likely support fair, inclusive
decisions), it ensures that the decision-maker will remain focused on the
principles that relate most closely to his or her expertise. Only once the
preferred option is identified in accordance with the statutory objective
should consideration be given to whether the decision would violate an
individual’s Charter rights. If that is the case then, following Doré, the
decision-maker must consider whether such a limit is reasonable, and
may calibrate the exercise of his or her discretion to insure that any rights
limit is proportionate in light of the regime’s broader purposes.
Such an approach is more likely to result in consistent decisions that
respect the Charter rights of participants. For example, given the
amorphous and pliable nature of Charter values, it is not clear that a
84
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Charter values approach would achieve the goals of substantive equality
for LGBT (lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender) families and students
that Professors Cameron and Daly seek. In fact, in Chamberlain v. Surrey
School District No. 36, in which the Court overturned a school board’s
decision declining to approve books that reflected diverse LGBT
families, it was the minority decision (which would have upheld the
board’s decision) that relied on Charter values.86 In its reasons, the
Chamberlain minority recognized the Charter value of non-discrimination
but, because of the amorphous nature of Charter values, was able to also
elevate the parental right to “make the decisions they deem necessary
to ensure the well-being and moral education of their children” to the
status of Charter value to be balanced on equal footing with the right to
non-discrimination, ultimately holding that the parental value outweighed
the discrimination.87
The example of Chamberlain demonstrates how the amorphous
character of Charter values is in fact more likely to result in policy
decisions that reflect the subjective values of decision-makers, whatever
those values may be.88 To the extent that one looks to the Charter to
protect vulnerable groups in administrative decision-making, a Charter
doctrine that moves the legal analysis away from the specific guarantees
enshrined in the Charter to the subjective discretion of an administrative
decision-maker does little to advance that goal.
A final example of Charter values creating ambiguity and being
relied upon at the expense of other societal interests was recently seen in
the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario’s decisions in Taylor-Baptiste v.
Ontario Public Service Employees Union.89 In that case, a manager at a
corrections facility commenced an application before the Human Rights
Tribunal of Ontario on the basis that users of the blog of the Union Local
had discriminated and harassed her on the basis of her sex and family
status, contrary to section 5(1) and (2) of the Human Rights Code.90 The
Tribunal agreed with the applicant that the expressions used relied on sexist
stereotypes of women “sleeping their way to the top”, but ultimately
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determined that the conduct was not discrimination with respect to
employment.91 A subsequent judicial review was dismissed by the
Divisional Court (motions for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal have
been filed).92
What is striking about these decisions is that the Tribunal (upheld by
the Divisional Court) appears to have reached its conclusion not on the
basis of a purposive application of its home statute (the Human Rights
Code), but in large part because of a Charter values analysis. Without
first determining whether the conduct at issue violated the Code, the
Tribunal determined that the expression in question, appearing as it did
on a union blog, was union speech and therefore close to the “core” of
the Charter’s right to freedom of expression as well as freedom of
association.93 The Tribunal therefore concluded that the conduct was not
discrimination in relation to employment under the Code.
In adopting the Charter values language to limit the scope of the
Code’s protections, the Tribunal made three errors that highlight the risk
associated with a “Charter values” approach to administrative decisionmaking. The Tribunal’s reasons, which were largely agreed with by the
Divisional Court, reflect much of the confusion created by the Supreme
Court’s Charter values jurisprudence.
First, the Tribunal expanded the contexts in which recourse is
properly made to the Charter. Section 5(1) of the Code, which prohibits
discrimination in relation to employment, is neither ambiguous, nor does
it confer upon the Tribunal a statutory discretion to determine what is or
what is not discrimination with respect to employment. Such a
determination is a legal question that the Tribunal is required to
determine on the basis of the facts before it. As discussed above, the case
law does not support courts or tribunals relying on Charter values in the
absence of a genuinely ambiguous statute or a statutory exercise of
discretion. Nonetheless, the rhetorical power of the Charter makes such
an approach difficult to avoid. Indeed, on review the Divisional Court
noted that “it is difficult to see any ambiguity in the language of the Code
on its face”, but then accepts that the Code “becomes ambiguous” when
91
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one takes into account the “context” of the respondent’s Charter rights.94
This effectively uses the Charter to create ambiguity where previously it
did not exist.
Second, by adopting a Charter values approach, the Tribunal effectively
expanded the scope of the Charter rights at issue, limiting the legislative
scope of the Code in a manner that would not have been available had
the legislation been challenged directly for having violated a specific
Charter right. For instance, the Tribunal found that the blog postings were
protected under not only freedom of expression, but also freedom of
association grounds.95 However, by adopting a Charter values approach, no
discussion was offered as to how a finding that the blog comments were
discriminatory would have violated section 2(d) of the Charter. Indeed,
instead of examining whether restrictions on discriminatory comments
would render “meaningful association to achieve workplace goals
effectively impossible” as would be required under a traditional section 2(d)
analysis,96 the Tribunal simply noted that the speech in question was union
speech made in the course of (but not as part of) collective bargaining.
Indeed, on review, the Divisional Court offered no analysis of the
substantive Charter values, deferring implicitly to the Tribunal’s own
Charter analysis, or lack thereof. As such, no analysis was provided by
either the Tribunal or the Divisional Court as to why Charter values would
weigh against a finding of discrimination in this case. This “Charter-lite”
approach to applying Charter values has the perverse effect of placing
greater limits on protective legislation than would result from a direct
constitutional challenge.
Finally, the Tribunal’s decision in Taylor-Baptiste highlights the risk
that a Charter values approach to decision-making turns every dispute
into a Charter case, one in which Charter rights (or values), are nearly
always in conflict. Worse, the resolution of that conflict must be
determined in the abstract, without a clear grounding in a decision based
on legislative purpose. The Tribunal in Taylor-Baptiste never reached a
conclusion about whether the conduct was discriminatory in the absence
of Charter considerations.97 Instead, it moved first to consider whether
the impact of such a finding would be consistent with the Charter values
of freedom of expression and freedom of association. This effectively
94
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shortcircuited the constitutional analysis, which is properly fact and
context-specific. The determination of whether a finding of discrimination
(and an order to support such a finding) violated a Charter right depends,
at least in part, on the nature of the expression at issue, and whether such
speech was close to the “core” of the freedom of expression right. By
adopting a Charter values approach, the Tribunal created an ambiguity
where there previously was none, leaving it the unenviable task of
determining whether amorphous Charter values were engaged in the
abstract.
Again, in my view the better approach is for courts or tribunals
to apply the law in accordance with legislative intent, and to reach a
provisional conclusion on that basis. Only if the Tribunal then determines
that a subsequent exercise of discretion (e.g., in the case of TaylorBaptiste, an order against the respondent) would violate the claimant’s
Charter rights, should the decision-maker assess whether such an
infringement is reasonable in the circumstances. In the example of the
Taylor-Baptiste case, instead of requiring the Tribunal to assess the
constitutional issues in the abstract, this approach would have provided
it the opportunity to finely tailor a remedy that reasonably limited the
rights of the claimant. In my view, this proposed approach is consistent
with the Court’s decision in Doré, but would clarify that the exercise of a
statutory discretion is only constrained by the potential violation of a
specific Charter right, with its attendant legal and evidentiary
requirements.

V. CONCLUSION
The feeling of discomfort experienced when confronted with a robot
or CGI character from the “uncanny valley” is based on a subconscious
sense that “something is not quite right” with this picture. It looks human,
but something is … wrong. A review of the Supreme Court’s Charter
values jurisprudence reveals a similar, fundamental flaw at its core.
With questionable scope to their functional use, and no real judicial
consideration of their substantive scope, Charter values are unhelpful
(at best) to the development of Canada’s constitutional jurisprudence,
and have created ambiguity, instead of resolving it. Worse, reliance on
the concept of Charter values appears in many cases to result in an
undisciplined approach to Charter analysis that would limit the
application of remedial legislation without reference to any Charter right
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having been infringed. The framers of the Constitution negotiated and
agreed to an entire Charter of enumerated rights. Developing and
refining an unwritten layer of Charter values onto those rights is
unnecessary and counter-productive.
As the Supreme Court itself has recognized, the overuse of Charter
values deprives us of the calibrated evidentiary and justificatory
requirements of direct constitutional challenges. Moreover, the
amorphous nature of Charter values creates, instead of resolving
ambiguity in the law and the work of statutory decision-makers, leaving
the substantive rights of claimants open to determination by the “gut”
feelings of decision-makers.
The concept and language of Charter values should therefore be
rejected. Courts and tribunals should climb out of the uncanny valley,
interpret and apply statutes in accordance with legislative intent, and then
apply any relevant, enumerated Charter right directly.

